I was about to conquer the world but then I got distracted by something shiny.
Post by charliegirl on Jul 5, 2007 10:58:29 GMT -5
www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/06pdf/05-983.pdf
The US Supreme Court ruled in favor of parents being able to sue on behalf of their child under IDEA without being guilty of practicing law without a license.
Prior to this when a parent in some states would try to represent themselves and their child in court under due process, they were considered to be practicing law without a license and stopped by the bar association. This limited the ability of parents who couldn't afford a lawyer in fighting for their child's FAPE rights.
In WINKELMAN v. PARMA CITY SCHOOL DIST this was addressed, and the parents have won the rights for all parents to represent their child in court!!!
No. 05–983. Argued February 27, 2007—Decided May 21, 2007
Held:
1. IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable rights, which are not limited to procedural and reimbursement-related matters but en-compass the entitlement to a free appropriate public education fortheir child. Pp. 4–17.
(a) IDEA’s text resolves the question whether parents or onlychildren have rights under the Act. Proper interpretation requiresconsidering the entire statutory scheme. IDEA’s goals include “en-sur[ing] that all children with disabilities have available to them afree appropriate public education” and “that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected,” 20
U. S. C. §§1400(d)(1)(A)–(B), and many of its terms mandate or oth-erwise describe parental involvement. Parents play “a significant role,” Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U. S. 49, 53, in the development of eachchild’s IEP, see §§1412(a)(4), 1414(d). They are IEP team members,§1414(d)(1)(B), and their “concerns” “for enhancing [their child’s] edu-cation” must be considered by the team, §1414(d)(3)(A)(ii). A State must, moreover, give “any party” who objects to the adequacy of theeducation provided, the IEP’s construction, or related matter the op-portunity “to present a complaint . . . ,” §1415(b)(6), and engage in anadministrative review process that culminates in an “impartial dueprocess hearing,” §1415(f)(1)(A), before a hearing officer. “Any partyaggrieved by the [hearing officer’s] findings and decision . . . [has] the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint.” §1415(i)(2)(A). A court or hearing officer may require a state agency“to reimburse the parents . . . for the cost of [private school] enroll-ment if . . . the agency had not made a free appropriate public educa-tion available to the child.” §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). IDEA also governswhen and to what extent a court may award attorney’s fees, see §1415(i)(3)(B), including an award “to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability,” §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). Pp. 5–9.
(b) These various provisions accord parents independent, en-forceable rights. Parents have enforceable rights at the administra-tive stage, and it would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme tobar them from continuing to assert those rights in federal court atthe adjudication stage. Respondent argues that parental involve-ment is contemplated only to the extent parents represent their child’s interests, but this view is foreclosed by the Act’s provisions. The grammatical structure of IDEA’s purpose of protecting “the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children,”§1400(d)(1)(B), would make no sense unless “rights” refers to the par-ents’ rights as well as the child’s. Other provisions confirm this view. See, e.g., §1415(a). Even if this Court were inclined to ignore theAct’s plain text and adopt respondent’s countertextual reading, the Court disagrees that sole purpose driving IDEA’s involvement of par-ents is to facilitate vindication of a child’s rights. It is not novel for parents to have a recognized legal interest in their child’s educationand upbringing.
The Act’s provisions also contradict the variation on respondent’s argument that parents can be “parties aggrieved” for aspects of thehearing officer’s findings and decision relating to certain procedures and reimbursements, but not “parties aggrieved” with regard to any
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3
Syllabus
challenge not implicating those limited concerns. The IEP proceed-ings entitle parents to participate not only in the implementation ofIDEA’s procedures but also in the substantive formulation of theirchild’s educational program. The Act also allows expansive challenge by parents of “any matter” related to the proceedings and requiresthat administrative resolution be based on whether the child “re-ceived a free appropriate public education,” §§1415(f)(3(E), with judi-cial review to follow. The text and structure of IDEA create in par-ents an independent stake not only in the procedures and costsimplicated by the process but also in the substantive decision to bemade. Incongruous results would follow, moreover, were the Court to accept the proposition that parents’ IDEA rights are limited to cer-tain nonsubstantive matters. It is difficult to disentangle the Act’sprocedural and reimbursement-related rights from its substantiveones, and attempting to do so would impose upon parties a confusingand onerous legal regime, one worsened by the absence of any ex-press guidance in IDEA concerning how a court might differentiatebetween these matters. This bifurcated regime would also leavesome parents without any legal remedy. Pp. 9–16.
(c) Respondent misplaces its reliance on Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. ___, when it contends that be-cause IDEA was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause, it mustprovide clear notice before it can be interpreted to provide independ-ent rights to parents. Arlington held that IDEA had not furnished clear notice before requiring States to reimburse experts’ fees to pre-vailing parties in IDEA actions. However, this case does not invoke Arlington’s rule, for the determination that IDEA gives parents inde-pendent, enforceable rights does not impose any substantive condi-tion or obligation on States that they would not otherwise be required by law to observe. The basic measure of monetary recovery is not ex-panded by recognizing that some rights repose in both the parent and the child. Increased costs borne by States defending against suits brought by nonlawyers do not suffice to invoke Spending Clause con-cerns, particularly in light of provisions in IDEA that empower courtsto award attorney’s fees to prevailing educational agencies if a parent files an action for an “improper purpose,” §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III).Pp. 16–17.
2. The Sixth Circuit erred in dismissing the Winkelmans’ appealfor lack of counsel. Because parents enjoy rights under IDEA, they are entitled to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf. In light of this holding, the Court need not reach petitioners’ argument concern-ing whether IDEA entitles parents to litigate their child’s claims pro se. Pp. 17–18.
Reversed and remanded.
The US Supreme Court ruled in favor of parents being able to sue on behalf of their child under IDEA without being guilty of practicing law without a license.
Prior to this when a parent in some states would try to represent themselves and their child in court under due process, they were considered to be practicing law without a license and stopped by the bar association. This limited the ability of parents who couldn't afford a lawyer in fighting for their child's FAPE rights.
In WINKELMAN v. PARMA CITY SCHOOL DIST this was addressed, and the parents have won the rights for all parents to represent their child in court!!!
No. 05–983. Argued February 27, 2007—Decided May 21, 2007
Held:
1. IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable rights, which are not limited to procedural and reimbursement-related matters but en-compass the entitlement to a free appropriate public education fortheir child. Pp. 4–17.
(a) IDEA’s text resolves the question whether parents or onlychildren have rights under the Act. Proper interpretation requiresconsidering the entire statutory scheme. IDEA’s goals include “en-sur[ing] that all children with disabilities have available to them afree appropriate public education” and “that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected,” 20
U. S. C. §§1400(d)(1)(A)–(B), and many of its terms mandate or oth-erwise describe parental involvement. Parents play “a significant role,” Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U. S. 49, 53, in the development of eachchild’s IEP, see §§1412(a)(4), 1414(d). They are IEP team members,§1414(d)(1)(B), and their “concerns” “for enhancing [their child’s] edu-cation” must be considered by the team, §1414(d)(3)(A)(ii). A State must, moreover, give “any party” who objects to the adequacy of theeducation provided, the IEP’s construction, or related matter the op-portunity “to present a complaint . . . ,” §1415(b)(6), and engage in anadministrative review process that culminates in an “impartial dueprocess hearing,” §1415(f)(1)(A), before a hearing officer. “Any partyaggrieved by the [hearing officer’s] findings and decision . . . [has] the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint.” §1415(i)(2)(A). A court or hearing officer may require a state agency“to reimburse the parents . . . for the cost of [private school] enroll-ment if . . . the agency had not made a free appropriate public educa-tion available to the child.” §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). IDEA also governswhen and to what extent a court may award attorney’s fees, see §1415(i)(3)(B), including an award “to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability,” §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). Pp. 5–9.
(b) These various provisions accord parents independent, en-forceable rights. Parents have enforceable rights at the administra-tive stage, and it would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme tobar them from continuing to assert those rights in federal court atthe adjudication stage. Respondent argues that parental involve-ment is contemplated only to the extent parents represent their child’s interests, but this view is foreclosed by the Act’s provisions. The grammatical structure of IDEA’s purpose of protecting “the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children,”§1400(d)(1)(B), would make no sense unless “rights” refers to the par-ents’ rights as well as the child’s. Other provisions confirm this view. See, e.g., §1415(a). Even if this Court were inclined to ignore theAct’s plain text and adopt respondent’s countertextual reading, the Court disagrees that sole purpose driving IDEA’s involvement of par-ents is to facilitate vindication of a child’s rights. It is not novel for parents to have a recognized legal interest in their child’s educationand upbringing.
The Act’s provisions also contradict the variation on respondent’s argument that parents can be “parties aggrieved” for aspects of thehearing officer’s findings and decision relating to certain procedures and reimbursements, but not “parties aggrieved” with regard to any
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3
Syllabus
challenge not implicating those limited concerns. The IEP proceed-ings entitle parents to participate not only in the implementation ofIDEA’s procedures but also in the substantive formulation of theirchild’s educational program. The Act also allows expansive challenge by parents of “any matter” related to the proceedings and requiresthat administrative resolution be based on whether the child “re-ceived a free appropriate public education,” §§1415(f)(3(E), with judi-cial review to follow. The text and structure of IDEA create in par-ents an independent stake not only in the procedures and costsimplicated by the process but also in the substantive decision to bemade. Incongruous results would follow, moreover, were the Court to accept the proposition that parents’ IDEA rights are limited to cer-tain nonsubstantive matters. It is difficult to disentangle the Act’sprocedural and reimbursement-related rights from its substantiveones, and attempting to do so would impose upon parties a confusingand onerous legal regime, one worsened by the absence of any ex-press guidance in IDEA concerning how a court might differentiatebetween these matters. This bifurcated regime would also leavesome parents without any legal remedy. Pp. 9–16.
(c) Respondent misplaces its reliance on Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. ___, when it contends that be-cause IDEA was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause, it mustprovide clear notice before it can be interpreted to provide independ-ent rights to parents. Arlington held that IDEA had not furnished clear notice before requiring States to reimburse experts’ fees to pre-vailing parties in IDEA actions. However, this case does not invoke Arlington’s rule, for the determination that IDEA gives parents inde-pendent, enforceable rights does not impose any substantive condi-tion or obligation on States that they would not otherwise be required by law to observe. The basic measure of monetary recovery is not ex-panded by recognizing that some rights repose in both the parent and the child. Increased costs borne by States defending against suits brought by nonlawyers do not suffice to invoke Spending Clause con-cerns, particularly in light of provisions in IDEA that empower courtsto award attorney’s fees to prevailing educational agencies if a parent files an action for an “improper purpose,” §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III).Pp. 16–17.
2. The Sixth Circuit erred in dismissing the Winkelmans’ appealfor lack of counsel. Because parents enjoy rights under IDEA, they are entitled to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf. In light of this holding, the Court need not reach petitioners’ argument concern-ing whether IDEA entitles parents to litigate their child’s claims pro se. Pp. 17–18.
Reversed and remanded.
Thats a GREAT BIG step forward!
